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Readers of this journal may recall my recent review article on the Kyoto 
School and the West (The Eastern Buddhist XVI, 2, Autumn 1983). Therein 
1 suggested that we needed more materials in English representative of second 
and third generation thinkers in the Kyoto School. A recent book by Takeuchi 
Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism: In Search of the Timeless Spirit of Primitive 
Buddhism (New York: Crossroad, 1983), is exactly the type of publication I 
had in mind.
Takeuchi’s thought is at the core of the Japanese tradition in the philosophy 
of religion as initially formulated by Nishida Kitard and carried through by 
Tanabe Hajime and Nishitani Keiji. With his feet planted firmly in Japanese 
buddhological scholarship, Takeuchi also embraces Western hermeneutical 
methods and philosophical concerns. One can see, therefore, the influence of 
the buddhology of Ui Hakuju, the existential cultural criticism of Watsuji 
Tetsuro, the philosophical concerns of Tanabe Hajime, and the existential 
exegesis of Rudolf Bultmann. The Introduction by James W. Heisig, the editor 
and translator of this work, carefully explains Takeuchi’s sources and inspira­
tions, giving us an unusually sharp picture of the scholar and the man.
The Introduction is just one example of Heisig’s care in bridging the gap be­
tween Takeuchi’s Japanese world and this book’s Western audience. Just as ad­
mirable is his careful selection of texts to include. The book is actually an an­
thology of seven of Takeuchi’s essays originally appearing in German, Japanese, 
or English, and covering a span of about two decades. Nevertheless, by his acute 
sensitivity to the structure of Takeuchi’s thinking, Heisig has merged the seven 
independent works into a meaningful whole. There is, admittedly, some 
unavoidable repetition from one essay to the next, but in general the book comes 
together very well and it can be read without contrivance as a single unified 
work. The translation is also smooth and readable, a notable achievement given 
the multilingual nature and subtlety of the sources involved. Perhaps the greatest 
compliment to Heisig is that his editing and translating are so good that his 
contribution can be easily overlooked. The reader is taken into direct dialogue 
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with Takeuchi himself. We could not ask, nor want, anything better.
My first point about the work itself concerns Takeuchi’s style of thinking 
and writing, something that I have admired since I first read his Shinran to 
gendai (Shinran Today) (Tokyo: Chud-kdronsha, 1974) some years ago. To put 
it simply, Takeuchi blends the objectivity of the scholar with the existential sen­
sitivity of the priest. He has a rare gift for exhuming an abstruse Buddhist doc­
trine, analyzing it, and then transferring it into the midst of our own experien­
tial context; that is, when he takes what at first seems distant and irrelevant 
and then transforms it into an object of existential immediacy. He accomplishes 
this feat via three techniques.
First, he is a master with metaphor, a magician with imagery. Usually these 
are not poetic, extended metaphors, but rather concrete pictures and com­
parisons sprinkled throughout the prose. If we look for the first instance of 
this mode of explanation, we need go no further than the second paragraph 
of the book wherein we find a forked tree, an underground spring, and a 
reference to Paul’s “folly of the cross” (I Corinthians 1:18 ff.). The contrast 
being discussed is the relation between religion and philosophy in primitive Bud­
dhism and primitive Christianity. The point is simply made and then Takeuchi 
moves on. Some Christian historians might well want to take issue with the 
generality, but regardless of how one takes the point being made, the images 
of the double trunked tree and the cross are sharply etched in the reader’s 
imagination.
A second stylistic theme in Takeuchi’s writing is the symbiotic relationship 
between thought and practice. No Buddhist doctrine is analyzed as being com­
pletely independent of Buddhist practice and no Buddhist discipline is given 
a significance unrelated to the Buddhist dharma. Thus, as complex and 
sophisticated as his ideas may be, Takeuchi is sure to ground them in the praxis 
of the Buddhist’s everyday life.
Third, Takeuchi incarnates the Shin Buddhist temper of mind. There is, of 
course, no single mental attitude that we can attribute to fifteen million Japanese, 
but there is a distinctively tariki (other power) ring to Takeuchi’s approach to 
philosophizing. The Shin Buddhist influence is rather difficult to characterize, 
but there is undeniably a difference in tone between, say, Shinran and his non- 
Pure Land Buddhist contemporaries like Dogen and Nichiren. That difference 
carries over into Takeuchi’s philosophical style. There is, first of all, a pervading 
sense of humility. Takeuchi approaches the study of the Buddha with self- 
reproach and reverence. There is not the sureness of Buddha-transmission so 
commonly expressed in Zen texts, but only those convictions arising from an 
awareness of one’s own limitations. Secondly, positions are not rejected on strict­
ly philosophical or dialectical grounds, but rather because they are not existen­
tially satisfying to the needs of the Buddhist practitioner. In fact, ultimately 
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the Buddhist who must test the theories is none other than oneself, in this case, 
Takeuchi the Buddhist writer. This internal, practical criterion of truth is 
precarious—it is always open to self-deception, for example—but Takeuchi 
would say, as Shinran indeed did say, that there is no other alternative. For Shin 
Buddhists like Shinran and Takeuchi, the human encounter with the Buddha’s 
enlightenment leads not to bliss but to awe, not to surrender but to sensitivity, 
not to independence but to trust. This attitude runs throughout Takeuchi’s 
writings and no aware reader can be blind to it.
We can now consider various aspects of the content of the work itself. First, 
as the subtitle suggests, the book primarily focuses on primitive Buddhism or, 
as it is now more generally called in English, Early Buddhism. In other words, 
the emphasis is on the Buddhist tradition preserved in the Pali Nikdyas and 
Chinese Agamas before the interpretations of the Abhidharma schools 
developed. The Early Buddhist tradition has already been analyzed from various 
perspectives: Louis de la Vallee Poussin discussed it from the standpoint of the 
formation of religious community, Theodore Stcherbatsky from the standpoint 
of logic and epistemology, K. N. Jayatilleke and David J. Kalupahana from 
that of Indian empiricism, and Rune A. Johansson from that of mysticism, 
for example. In contrast to these, Takeuchi’s approach is distinctively existen­
tial. In other words, according to his account, Early Buddhism arose out of 
an acute and painful insight into the fundamental structures of human existence. 
The purpose of the Buddhist path was, therefore, not philosophical insight, 
but the embodiment of a new way of living and relating in the world. Hence, 
Takeuchi prefers to speak of andtman as a centering of the self, rather than 
the elimination of the ego. For Takeuchi, anitman is the rejection of rigidity 
in favor of the flexibility needed for personal growth.
This existential interpretation gives Takeuchi’s account a marked sense of con­
temporaneity. There are two distinct advantages to this. First, his vocabulary 
and philosophical agenda bring Buddhism into a terminological proximity to 
the existential trends in Judeo-Christian theology. Takeuchi, in fact, makes many 
passing references to Christianity, both the scriptural and the modern theological 
traditions. Usually, his points are well-taken and provocative, but since they 
are unelaborated (except somewhat in the last chapter), they are really more 
promissory than exemplary of any “Buddhist-Christian dialogue.”
The second advantage to the existential approach is that it engages the con­
temporary reader who is more interested in the spirit of Buddhism as a modern 
religious option than in the letter of the text as understood by the ancient In­
dian Buddhists themselves. For example, after reading the book, the 
undergraduates in my class with little previous exposure to Buddhism could not 
give precise characterizations of such central notions as, say, anatmart andprati- 
tya samutpdda, but they did understand the general principles behind the terms.
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More significantly, though, the book also gave them a clear sense of Buddhism 
as a continuous tradition and as a religious way of life relevant to the human 
predicament as they, twentieth-century Americans, understand it. That is, 
through Takeuchi’s approach, they developed a deeper appreciation of Bud­
dhism itself and they wanted to learn more about it.
Of course, Takeuchi’s existential interpretation leaves itself open to criticism 
from more traditional buddhologists. In particular, the most likely objection 
would be that Takeuchi has his own existential definition of religion and that 
his reading of the Early Buddhist texts is filtered by that definition. In other 
words, the argument would be that Takeuchi finds existential concerns in the 
texts only because he looks for them. The more traditional buddhologist would 
maintain that while there are undoubtedly some passages that can be so read, 
the overall thrust of the corpus of Early Buddhist writings points in some other 
direction. On the surface at least, there is some validity to this concern. As a 
matter of fact, Takeuchi does tend to analyze several selected passages in detail, 
rather than support his case with extensive citations. To press this criticism of 
his approach too far, however, would be a misinterpretation of Takeuchi’s in­
tent. Though he is primarily speaking of Early Buddhism, Takeuchi’s concerns 
go beyond the strictly historical.
In the final analysis, Takeuchi approaches Buddhist texts in a manner more 
akin to the methodology of a Christian theologian than a historian of religion. 
He is, as it were, a buddhologian rather than a buddhologist. Whereas the bud­
dhologist looks into the text for the philological meaning of words and seeks 
an understanding of the historical and social circumstances under which the 
work was written, the buddhologian looks into the text for the light it can shed 
on some pertinent religious or philosophical problem. Whereas the buddhologist 
tries to discover what the text originally meant, the buddhologian seeks an 
understanding of what the text means for us today. For the buddhologist, the 
text reveals something about the people who authored it; for the buddhologian, 
the text reveals something about the people reading it.
Certainly, the two cannot be completely separated. The buddhologian is bound 
by tradition and cannot simply make the text say anything whatever. Conversely, 
no buddhologist, however “scientific,” can completely escape the parameters 
of one’s own culture and time in looking for the meaning of the text. Indeed, 
the very idea of the scientific approach to religion only developed in the in­
tellectual milieu of the twentieth-century West.
Still, despite the fruitful interaction between the two groups, the difference 
in emphasis is clear and neither side need apologize for its methodology. Nor 
should it be the case, however, that persons are criticized on inappropriate 
grounds. Certainly Takeuchi is not maintaining that the Early Buddhists were, 
historically speaking, actually existentialists. Rather, he is saying that the con­
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figuration of their thought is such that, were they living in today’s situation 
with the vocabulary of existentialism available to them, they would have cer­
tain existentialist themes resonant with their own. Obviously, such a claim can­
not be evaluated on traditional buddhological grounds alone. In the final 
analysis, Takeuchi must be criticized as a buddhologian, not a buddhologist. 
But what is involved in such a critical stance? First, we must ask whether 
Takeuchi’s existential reading of Buddhism is consistent enough with Buddhist 
tradition to be considered authentic. Second, we must ask whether Takeuchi’s 
Buddhist existentialism adequately expresses the existential concerns he raises. 
Let us take up each issue in turn.
First, just how Buddhist is Takeuchi’s Buddhist existentialism? Takeuchi’s 
scholarship is not at all in question. He supports his statements with the careful 
unraveling of passages from central Pali and East Asian Buddhist texts. He is 
particularly sensitive to subtle differences in nuance between Pali and Chinese 
versions of the early sutras. Still, as a buddhologian and not merely a bud­
dhologist, he is looking for something in the texts; his attention is drawn to 
particular themes. Most of the time, his interpretations are completely in ac­
cord with traditional emphases by other scholars of the Early Buddhist tradi­
tion, but still his analysis is clearly informed by the existential tradition. We 
have already referred, for example, to his interpretation of ana f man as the 
centered self, rather than a no-self. A more traditional buddhologist might find 
Takeuchi’s approach here unusual and perhaps even anachronistic. Still, any 
objective interpreter of Early Buddhism would have to admit that we have on­
ly a most general idea of the theories of self current in India at the time of the 
Buddha. Without a clear grasp of alternative theories, it is difficult to say 
positively what position the Buddha’s theory of andtman was meant to reject. 
Thus, Takeuchi’s line of interpretation is at least arguable, even if not general­
ly accepted. To this reader, at least, it was a refreshingly new perspective.
There are other aspects of Takeuchi’s existential reading of Buddhism that 
are more profound, but also problematic. First, because he emphasizes the 
enlightenment experience as a personal metanoia, an idea that shows his in­
debtedness to his teacher Tanabe Hajime incidentally, Takeuchi tends to em­
phasize the individual almost to the exclusion of the social. In short, I have 
the feeling that the role of the sangha in his analysis is underplayed. It is odd 
that Japanese philosophers of religion such as Takeuchi and Nishitani often 
become so focused on the meaning of enlightenment that they neglect, to some 
extent, the critical functions of religious community. This is perhaps one of 
the blinders of the existential perspective on religion, in general. Takeuchi is 
certainly not completely unaware of this problem: he discusses Heidegger’s ig­
noring human relationships and the significance of Buber’s “I-Thou” relation, 
for example (pp. 121-123), but his analysis is not detailed enough to address the 
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issue of sangha squarely. Perhaps he could do so (or already has done so) in 
some other works. In any case, this book, as it stands, is somewhat too heavily 
focused on the individual.
A second influence of existentialism on Takeuchi’s analysis that 1 find pro­
blematic is his treatment of historicity. In this area, Takeuchi’s philosophical 
preference leads him not so much to neglect an important topic as it does to 
analyze a topic that is not really there. In general, Takeuchi’s line of argument 
is to see in Buddhism a Bultmann-like emphasis on eschatological existence. 
This works very well, indeed brilliantly, in the way he discusses Shin Buddhism. 
In fact, his existential analysis of the idea of mappd (age of the latter dharma) 
strikes so deeply into the heart of Shin Buddhism that it seems completely con­
vincing. The wonder is that other interpreters of Shin Buddhism have not seen 
the parallel with Bultmann before in such a sharp manner. The problem, 
however, is that Takeuchi wants to fine this view of historicity in the Early Bud­
dhist tradition as well.
Generally, he sees the eschatological view as the natural outgrowth of the 
Early Buddhist view of impermanence and death. This strikes me as an odd 
step to take and, frankly, I think the problem boils down to the fact that the 
Christian tradition can explicitly relate historicity and personal death because 
of the events of the Incarnation and Resurrection. That is, through Christ’s 
life, death, and resurrection, the Christian finds a pattern being woven through 
history as well as an existential paradigm of human existence itself. There is 
no such tie between the personal and the historical in Buddhism (with the ex­
ception of Nichiren perhaps). At least, I know of no such symbolic connection 
and Takeuchi does not convince me there is one. This does not mean that 
Takeuchi’s point is not viable, but only that he cannot follow Bultmann in see­
ing an obvious connection between the personal and the historical. The con­
nection must be drawn out carefully and fully for the distinctively Buddhist 
view of the two. My own suspicion is that this connection might be understood 
in strictly Shin Buddhist terms with the ambiguities about the historicity and 
ultimateness of Amida, but I have no idea where I could find it in the Early 
Buddhist tradition.
This now brings us to the second part of our evaluation of Takeuchi as an 
existential buddhologian. Does his Buddhism illumine our understanding of 
general problems in the existential tradition? For this question, the last essay, 
“Freeing and the World Beyond,” is the most revealing. There Takeuchi is at 
his best as a religious philosopher. Not only does he make probing points about 
the perspectives of Tillich, Bultmann, and Heidegger (in both his earlier and 
later phases of thinking), but he also comes forth most clearly on his own as 
a spokesperson for the existential validity of Buddhist, particularly Shin Bud­
dhist, philosophy.
139
KASULIS
In particular, Takeuchi sees the problem of secularization as one confron­
ting the entire world and all the world’s religions. In that last essay, Takeuchi 
essentially investigates the reality of the Pure Land Paradise in the West. Ob­
viously, at one time the premodern Shin Buddhist could have taken the reality 
in a literal, metaphysical sense: the Pure Land was actually thought to exist 
somewhere beyond this world. For today’s modern, secularized Japanese, 
however, what could such a claim mean? Where could “beyond this world” 
be? In short, Takeuchi finds the need for a process of demythologizing the 
Western Pure Land Paradise. Yet, at the same time as he is learning from Tillich 
and Bultmann, he also recognizes that, ontologically speaking, the Buddhist 
perspective cannot follow too closely the Judeo-Christian worldview. In par­
ticular, Takeuchi recognizes that for Buddhism the relationship between the 
human and the sacred must go beyond the personal relationship of human be­
ing and God:
That is to say, what is also transcendent to the world (its yonder shore) 
cannot be a transcendent reality simply in the sense that God is said 
to be transcendent to humanity: it cannot be envisaged exclusively from 
the viewpoint of the relationship between God and humanity. It has 
equally to be understood in terms of a relationship to the world, as 
a world that stands over and against our world as well as a Thou that 
stands over against an I. [p. 132]
For this reason, despite his general preference for Bultmann’s theology and 
its themes of eschatological existence and demythologizing, Takeuchi also feels 
drawn to the later Heidegger’s notion of the fourfold harmony (Geviert) and 
to Tillich’s view of God as the Ground of Being. In the final analysis, Takeuchi 
manages to blend those theological views with certain key passages from Shinran. 
The result is a position which basically uses Bultmann’s eschatological theme 
of “advening from the future,” but without its connotations of a personal God 
behind the process. The ultimate view, as Takeuchi himself suggests, is a 
Bultmann-like perspective filtered through the thought of the later, rather than 
earlier, Heidegger. This makes for an extraordinarily provoking worldview, one 
that can appeal not only to Shin Buddhists, but to secularized Christians wishing 
to affirm the omnipresence of the sacred in the world and in history, without 
also affirming a personal God. In this regard, Takeuchi fully reveals the character 
of his “Buddhist existentialism.”
In conclusion, this book is a profound study in Buddhist thought that deserves 
the attention of both Buddhist scholars and Western theologians. In many 
respects, the book is controversial. Furthermore, because of its breadth of focus, 
some parts may be of more interest to one reader than another. The Heart of 
Buddhism is not so much a systematic work as a series of philosophical vi­
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gnettes that jolt our comfortable assumptions about both Buddhism and Chirs- 
tian theology. It is a challenging book and I hope it achieves a readership wor­
thy of the challenges it presents.
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